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Abstract
Major League Baseball (MLB) organizations spend millions of dollars each year on
athletes with the end goal of winning a World Series title. However when an organization signs a
player to a long term contract are they actually receiving the production that they paid for? Under
the MLB’s current form of player compensation players may not be properly motivated or at
least not motivated to perform at their highest level.
The intent of this thesis was to apply expectancy theory in assessing Major League
Baseball’s current form of player compensation. It evaluates how well players are currently
motivated to perform on the field, and if any improvements can be made. This is done through
the statistical analysis of MLB organizations yearly salary data, yearly win-loss record, and the
performance of 65 players two years prior to, one year prior to, and during their first contract
term directly following or extending past arbitration eligibility. Evidence shows that player
motivation, especially for position players, can be increased and several suggestions are made as
to how this can be improved and how MLB organizations can increase the odds of player
production matching compensation.
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Definition of Terms
BA= Batting Average= Hits/ At Bats
SLG= Slugging Percentage= (1B + 2*2B + 3*3B + 4*HR) / At Bats
OBP= On-Base Percentage= (Hits + Walks + Hit By Pitch) / (At Bats + Walks + Hit By Pitch +
Sacrifice Fly)
FPCT= Fielding Percentage= (Putouts + Assists) / (Putouts + Assists + Errors)
WAR= Wins Above Replacement= Represents the number of wins a player adds to their team
above what a replacement player would add
ERA= Earned Run Average= (9 * Earned Runs) / Innings Pitched
K/9= Strikeouts Per Nine Innings Pitched= (9 * Strikeouts) / Innings Pitched
WHIP= Walks and Hits Per Innings Pitched= (Walks + Hits) / Innings Pitched
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Introduction
Since the creation of free agency in 1976 player salaries in Major League Baseball
(MLB) have increased immensely. The average MLB salary in 1976 was $51,501 (Holtzman,
2012) and grew to $3,440,000 in 2012 (MLB Salaries). That’s an astronomical 6,679% increase.
Due to the large amount of money involved in player contracts today, it has become more
important than ever for teams to get production out of their highly paid athletes. This brings
about the question of whether or not MLB organizations actually get what they pay for when
signing a free-agent player to a long term contract. David Ahlstrom, et. al (1999, pg 181)
suggests that “if Major League Baseball teams pay free agents based on free-agent-year
performance, they might not be satisfied with the result.” This may be due to the fact that under
Major League Baseball’s current form of player compensation players are not properly
motivated.
This study will apply expectancy theory in assessing Major League Baseball’s current
form of player compensation. It will evaluate how well players are currently motivated to
perform on the field and if any improvements can be made. Previous studies in the area of
expectancy theory and MLB player compensation have focused on “non-pitchers” (Ahlstrom, et.
al, 1999; Duchon and Jago, 1981; Martin, et. al, 2011) or position players. This prevents the
researchers from getting a full view of MLB player compensation as they are left without data
from about 1/3 of the player pool. This study will analyze both position players and starting
pitchers, using a set of statistical categories including wins above replacement (WAR) to
compare the two. In order to better evaluate how player’s performance and motivation are
1

affected by long term contracts, player performance will be measured using the season two years
prior to the new contract, the season prior to the new contract, the first, middle, and last season of
their first contract that starts the year following or extends past their arbitration eligibility (given
that the contract is three years or longer), and career averages. This builds upon the research of
Ahlstrom, et. al, (1999), Martin, et. al, (2011), who evaluated performance of all position players
during the year prior to free-agency, year of free-agency, and year following free-agency. By
exploring player performance throughout their first contract extending past arbitration eligibility
this will enable one to see how performance and motivation differ during the first, middle, and
last year(s) of a contract. Previous studies (Ahlstrom, et. al 1999; Martin, et al, 2011) were able
to make conclusions on a player’s motivation to perform when signing a long-term contract but
not on how their performance and motivation differ throughout the term of that contract.
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Motivation in Sports
For years scholars have been trying to figure out what motivates a player (regardless of
sport) to perform. As a result, a great deal of research has been done on the topic of motivation in
sports. Prior research attempting to compare the link between pay and performance has focused
on the process theories of motivation. These theories include equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965)
and expectancy theory (Porter and Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964). However none have examined
player motivation using only expectancy theory. Instead the large majority of scholars have used
equity theory or a combination of equity theory and expectancy theory to evaluate player
motivation. Originally player motivation in the MLB was measured using only equity theory, but
through extensive research on the topic, researchers have found that expectancy theory has a
stronger link to motivation and player performance in the MLB than equity theory.
Equity Theory
The theory is based on the comparison of perceived inputs and outputs. Inequity is
perceived to exist when a person believes that the ratio of his or her outcomes (pay) to inputs
(performance) differs from the ratio of a referent other’s outcomes to inputs (Adams, 1965). A
“referent other” could include a co-worker (teammate) or some other peer (player on different
team). Adams (1965) summarized his theory to show that an individual goes through the
following train of thought: 1) An individual perceives inequity, which creates tension. 2) This
tension is directly proportional to the magnitude of the inequity. 3) The strength of the
individual’s motivation to reduce the inequity is proportional to the magnitude of the inequity.
Put differently, when individuals feel as though they are being treated unfairly (under-paid) in
3

comparison to their peers they will attempt to restore a balance between their inputs and
outcomes and the inputs and outcomes of a referent other. Adams (1965) hypothesized a set of
responses that individuals engage in to restore equity. These include: 1) changing one’s own
inputs or outcomes; 2) changing the inputs or outcomes of the referent other; 3) cognitively
distorting the inputs or outcomes; 4) changing the referent other; or 5) leaving the situation.
Equity Theory in Major League Baseball
The first study to test motivation of MLB players using equity theory was conducted by
Lord and Hohenfeld (1979). Their sample consisted of 23 position players in the MLB who
chose to play out their options by not signing a contract before the start of the 1977 season. Of
this sample, 10 signed during the 1976 season and 13 played the entire season without a contract
and participated in the free-agent draft after the 1976 season. These players were referred to as
“signers” and “non-signers.” The performance data of these players as well as their teammates
were compiled for the seasons between 1973 and 1977. They found that the performance of both
signers and non-signers declined in 1976 as compared to their performance in 1975 and then
increased in 1977. These results were believed to be caused by the player’s feelings of inequity
in 1976 caused by their underpayment relative to other players. The increase in performance in
1977 was a result of the players receiving new contracts with higher salaries. Lord and
Hohenfeld concluded that these findings provided support for equity theory.
Robert Lord conducted another study using equity theory to examine the motivation of
MLB players in 1989, this time with Neil Hauenstein. The study specifically tested “the effects
of final-offer arbitration on the performance of Major League Baseball players” (Hauenstein and
4

Lord, 1989 pg. 147). In order to test this, Hauenstein and Lord used a sample of 88 MLB players
(40 pitchers and 48 nonpitchers) who had a salary dispute settled by final-offer arbitration
between the years of 1978 and 1984. The offensive performance data of these players were
gathered at three separate points; 1) career average up to but not including the season prior to
arbitration, 2) average performance in the season prior to arbitration, and 3) average performance
during the postarbitration season. Other relevant player data included the age of the player and
his years of experience in the major leagues at the time of arbitration. They found that
“arbitration losers showed greater performance decrements relative to arbitration winners”
(Hauenstein and Lord, 1989 pg. 158). This meant that those who received less money than they
had expected through salary arbitration performed at a lower level than those who received more
than expected. Hauenstein and Lord also concluded that the change in postarbitration
performance was related to the magnitude of the discrepancy between monetary figures.
Expectancy Theory
According to Vroom (1964), motivation is a factor of an individual’s expectancy,
instrumentality, and valence. Where expectancy is a person’s perception of his or her ability to
accomplish an objective, instrumentality is a person’s perception of whether or not they will be
rewarded for accomplishing that objective and valence is the value a person places on the
outcome or reward. In general, the higher one’s expectancy or value of the outcome or reward,
and the stronger the link between the outcome and reward, the better the chance of motivation.
Stated differently, one’s effort to perform is a variable measured by one’s ability (or perceived
ability) to complete a task (expectancy), the idea one will receive a reward upon completion of
5

the task (instrumentality), and the value the person places on this reward (valence). “Expectancy
theory assumes that people have well-defined preferences among various outcomes (rewards) of
their actions, and they will adjust their efforts based on those expected outcomes” (Ahlstrom et.
al, 1999, pg. 185). Vroom (1964) argued that a clear and strong link between pay and
performance will aid in leading to increased motivation. This link between pay and performance
is known as instrumentality. If there is a strong link between pay and performance, for example a
factory worker who is paid based on how many widgets he creates, then there is said to be high
instrumentality. According to Vroom (1964) that worker will be motivated to create as many
widgets as possible since it will lead to an increase in pay, given that pay is important to the
individual (valence). The effects of instrumentality were evaluated by Georgopoulos et. al (1957)
in a study of a unionized appliance factory. The study found that workers who reported high payperformance outcome instrumentality tended to be higher producers than those who didn’t.
Similar results were obtained in a study by Jorgenson et. al (1973), in which they manipulated
performance-outcome instrumentality by paying employees in a temporary organization on either
an hourly basis (represented low instrumentality) or on a piece-rate basis (high instrumentality).
They found that the high-instrumentality group performed better than the low-instrumentality
group. To ensure that this was not a result of the members in each group, the groups were asked
to switch places. The same results were obtained; the high-instrumentality group exceeded the
low-instrumentality group in output and also exceeded its own previous performance under lowinstrumentality conditions. Both studies provide evidence that high-instrumentality leads to
higher motivation and therefore higher performance. However, there have been some criticisms
of Vroom’s model based on its simplicity. In particular Porter and Lawler (1968) assert that
6

Vroom’s model does not take into consideration a person’s own traits and abilities and role
perceptions when assessing the link between effort and performance. Lawler and Jenkins (1992)
explain that expectancy theory can be deceptively simple, in the sense that it can lead you to
believe that all an organization needs to do in order to increase productivity is relate a reward to
an obtainable level of performance. However, this is only true if the individual places a high
value (valence) on the reward. The main difficulty associated with using expectancy theory to
assess motivation is determining an individual’s valence. This is because everyone’s valence of a
reward is different. It is a function of an individual’s needs, wants, goals, and values.
Expectancy Theory in Major League Baseball
The first to test expectancy theory’s principles to evaluate the motivation of MLB players
were Duchon and Jago (1981). They had initially set out to extend the research of Lord and
Hohenfeld (1979), testing all non-pitchers (30 players in all) in the first three years of baseball’s
free-agency system. However, their results contradicted equity theory’s predictions in that player
performance increased for those in their free-agent year in 1977 and 1978. Consequently, they
decided to recast the results using expectancy theory. They concluded that the effects of equity
theory had only been important in the first year of the new free agency system, when players
were not sure what sort of contracts they would receive. However once the pay-performance link
had been well established, expectancy effects became increasingly important, suggesting that
players would strive to improve their bargaining positions in their free-agent year. These findings
are crucial because they imply that expectancy theory is more heavily tied to player motivation
in the context of MLB than equity theory.
7

Harder (1992) also studied equity and expectancy theories’ effects in MLB. His study
included all MLB players from 1976 to 1988. Both of Harder’s hypotheses were related to equity
theory. However, some of his findings can be related to expectancy theory. The relevant findings
include “career runs created and career runs created per season were significant positive
predictors of logged salaries each year, which shows that major-league baseball is a pay-forperformance context” (Harder, 1992, pg. 326). He also found that “Being eligible for free agency
the following season had a significant negative effect on runs created in 1987 and 1988, counter
to what expectancy theory predicts” (Harder, 1992, pg. 330). This finding is contradictory to
those of others (Ahstrom et. al, 1999; Duchon and Jago,1981; Martin et. al, 2011) and to the
basis of expectancy theory since according to the theory one would predict that players would
perform at a higher level the year before being eligible for free-agency in order to increase their
chances of signing a large contract (in terms of monetary compensation).
Possibly the largest study of expectancy theory in the context of MLB player motivation
was conducted by Ahlstrom et. al (1999). They too used both equity theory and expectancy
theory, but were the first to test hypotheses directly related to expectancy theory. The sample for
the study consisted of nonpitcher MLB free agents from 1976 to 1992 who signed contracts with
new teams, 172 in all. The study compared player performance during; 1) free-agent year vs.
previous year’s performance, 2) free-agent year vs. career average, 3) 1st year of new contract vs.
free-agent year, and 4) 1st year of new contract vs. career average. In relation to these
comparisons they formed four hypotheses with respect to equity theory and expectancy theory;
1) Player performance will be higher in the free-agent year than in previous years, 2) A player’s
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performance will be higher in his free-agent year than his career average, 3) Player performance
will be lower in the 1st year of the new contract than in the previous free-agent year, and 4) A
player’s performance will be lower in the 1st year of his new contract than his career average.
The results of the study gave some support to hypotheses 3 and 4 in relation to expectancy
theory, showing that batting performance does indeed decline during the 1st year of a new
contract. The results of this study have major implications for MLB contracts as it suggests that
“guaranteed contracts harm player motivation, ostensibly by weakening the link between pay and
performance, and particularly in the 1st year or two of a contract” (Ahlstrom et al., 1999 pg. 191).
A study conducted by Martin et. al (2011) provides further support for the findings of
Ahlstrom et. al (1999) that guaranteed long-term contracts harm player motivation. Their study
consisted of the MLB free-agent classes from 1996 to 2008 who fit the following criteria; 1) The
player signed a multi-year contract as a free agent with a MLB team, 2) the players primary
position is not pitcher, 3) the player must have made at least 250 plate appearances in the season
before his contract year, his contract year, and the first year of his new deal. Of the 293 players
who fit the criteria, 160 were randomly selected to participate. “A comparison of the mean
statistics also showed a sharp decline in performance in the year following the signing of a new
contract. Postcontract-year performance dipped below precontract-year output. The tests found
that this was a statistically significant drop in player performance in each instance” (Martin et al.,
2011, pg. 21).
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MLB Player Measurement and Compensation
Major League Baseball organizations spend a great deal of time, effort, and money
determining a player’s monetary value. Statistics from previous years are analyzed to evaluate
current performance and make projections for the future. Since Micheal Lewis’s Moneyball
(2003), the use of saber metrics to evaluate player performance has become extremely popular.
Previously players were evaluated by scouts on categories such as mechanics and body form.
These are still used today but to a lesser extent. Players are currently compensated based on a
team’s analysis of past performance and future projections. Long-term contracts are given to
high performing and high-potential athletes in order to “lock them up” and prevent a bidding war
between teams later on. However, just because a player has performed well in the past does not
guarantee that he will perform well in the future. Lackritz (1990) suggests that players should be
paid on an annual basis and that their salary should be based on both their individual and team
performance that year. From an expectancy theory standpoint this makes a lot of sense. Players
will be motivated to perform at a high level in order to obtain higher compensation. It will be as
if every year is a free-agent year. Dinerstein (2007) provides further evidence that players should
be paid on a year-to-year or short term basis rather than long term. He says that players at the
beginning of long-term contracts know that they have locked in specific salaries and may expect
that that their current performance will have no impact on their compensation. This may explain
why player performance decreases during the first year of a new contract. However Stankiewitcz
(2009, pg. 82) findings contradict this view, “a player with a short-term contract will be less
productive than a player with a long-term contract”. Although she does note that her model does

10

not differentiate between the different types of players in the MLB. Her findings may be a result
of the fact that typically long-term contracts are given to high performing athletes whereas low
performing athletes are given short-term deals.

11

Hypotheses
Three hypotheses will be tested by this study. Each one aimed at evaluating Major
League Baseball’s current form of player compensation, and how well it motivates players to
perform. Table 1 provides a summary of the hypotheses. The hypotheses test expectancy
theory’s principles and measure player performance and motivation before, during, and after
signing a new contract. Expectancy theory predicts that if a player perceives a strong relationship
between his performances and subsequent rewards such as the signing of a new contract (high
instrumentality). He will be motivated to perform at a high level. However this assumes that the
signing of a new contract and pay associated with it is of importance to that player. Therefore
one can reason that as long as this is important to a player, then a player in the final year of a
contract should be motivated to improve his performance. However after signing a contract,
instrumentality is lessened, and thus his motivation to perform is reduced. The first hypothesis
will test the difference between the last year of an existing contract and the first year of a new
contract. Expectancy theory predicts that a player’s performance should be higher during the
final year of the existing contract than the first year of the new contract. This is because
instrumentality is lessened once a contract is signed. The second hypothesis will test whether
player performance increases the closer a player gets to the end of their contract. Expectancy
theory predicts that performance will increase the closer a player gets to the end of a contract,
because instrumentality is increased. The final hypothesis will test whether multi-year contracts
decrease a player’s motivation to perform during the first year(s) of a contract. This will be
tested by comparing a player’s career averages to their performance during the first year(s) of a
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contract. Career averages are used a base line for which to compare performance during the first
few year(s). Expectancy theory predicts that long term contracts decrease a player motivation to
perform because instrumentality is decreased, therefore performance statistics will be lower
during the beginning of a contract than career averages.
Table 1 Hypotheses

Performance Comparison
First year of new contract vs. Final year of
existing contract
Early years of contract vs. Late years of contract

Early years of contract vs. Career average

Hypothesis
Player performance is lower during the first year
of a new contract than the final year of an existing
contract.
Player performance increases the closer a player
gets to the end of a contract period.
Guaranteed multi-year contracts decrease a
player’s motivation to perform during the first
year/few years of the contract.

*For position players a decrease in performance signifies a drop in each performance category. For starting pitchers a decrease in performance
signifies a rise in both ERA and WHIP and a drop in K/9, FPCT, and WAR.
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Methodology
In order to gage the MLB’s current form of player motivation on team performance, a
preliminary analysis consisting of all 30 teams in the MLB from 2000 to 2012 was conducted.
Each team’s yearly player salary and regular season win-loss record was analyzed using a
correlation. The sample for testing the hypotheses consisted of all position players and starting
pitchers on an active MLB roster in 2012 who had previously signed a contract extending past or
directly following their arbitration eligibility. The sample was limited to those players who also
met the following criteria; 1) The player signed a contract of at least three years with a MLB
team, 2) the player exceeded 130 at-bats (position players) or 50 innings pitched (starting
pitchers) in the season two years prior to the new contract, the year prior to the new contract, and
each year of their new contract. 130 at-bats and 50 innings pitched were chosen as they are
recognized by the MLB as the qualifications to determine a player’s rookie status. In order to
ensure accuracy of data only players who were on an active MLB roster in 2012 were included in
this study. Contract information on players not on a team in 2012 was either incomplete or
unattainable. Contract data was retrieved from Cotscontracts.com. In all 65 players fit the
criteria, 45 position players and 20 starting pitchers.
The performance data compiled for each position player included: batting average (BA),
slugging percentage (SLG), on-base percentage (OBP), fielding percentage (FPCT), and wins
above replacement (WAR). For starting pitchers the performance data compiled included: earned
run average (ERA), strikeouts per nine innings pitched (K/9), walks and hits per innings pitched
(WHIP), fielding percentage (FPCT), and wins above replacement (WAR). WAR will be used to
14

compare the performance of starting pitchers to position players. This is a great statistic since
one can literally list how valuable a player is to their team, regardless of them being a pitcher or
position player, based on their WAR. All performance data was retrieved from espn.com.
All performance measures were compiled for each player during the season two years
prior to the new contract, the season prior to the new contract, first year of the new contract,
middle year(s) of the contract, and final year of the new contract. In addition the career figures
for each player were compiled. A repeated measures analysis of variance was used to analyze the
data collected in order to test the hypotheses.
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Results
In order to present a base line for the study a Pearson Correlation was run in order to see
whether or not there is a direct correlation between Major League Baseball team’s yearly salaries
and their on-field performance. On-field performance was measured using the number of wins
each team earned per year. The Person Correlation is r=0.368 and p=.000, suggesting that there
is a correlation between MLB team’s yearly salaries and their on-field performance. However
this correlation is not perfect.
Position Players
The results of the positions players repeated measures ANOVA as well as mean
performance data are presented in Table 2 and 3.
Table 2 Repeated Measures ANOVA for Position Players

Performance
Measures

Type III
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

GreenhouseGeisser

p

BA

.005

3.265

.001

1.984

.114

SLG

.043

3.242

.013

3.586

.013

OBP

.008

3.120

.003

2.509

.059

FPCT

.001

2.325

.000

1.475

.232

WAR

60.136

2.924

20.565

4.955

.003
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Table 3 Position Players Mean/Std. Deviation Performance Statistics

Performance
Measures

Two
Years
Before
New
Contract

Year
Before
New
Contract

First Year
of New
Contract

Middle
Year(s) of
New
Contract

Last Year
of New
Contract

Career
Averages

BA

.277/.027

.291/.029

.282/.033

.283/.026

.282/.036

.282/.020

SLG

.447/.086

.483/.077

.456/.076

.459/.065

.444/.075

.456/.057

OBP

.348/.041

.365/.033

.355/.037

.360/.030

.352/.038

.355/.026

FPCT

.981/.019

.986/.011

.985/.012

.986/.011

.984/.017

.984/.012

WAR

2.72/2.07

4.05/1.95

3.24/2.25

3.21/1.88

2.86/2.34

2.65/1.39

The repeated measures ANOVA of position players showed a statistically significant
difference between years for SLG and WAR, while OBP approached significance according to
the Greenhouse-Geisser. For these statistics a Bonferroni post hoc test was run to show which
years there was a statistically significant difference. This test showed that there was a statistically
significant difference for SLG between the season one year prior to the new contract and the
middle year(s) of the new contract (p=.031) and also the season one year prior to the new
contract and the career averages (p=.001). For OBP the test showed a statistically significant
difference between the season one year before the new contract and the career averages (p=.006).
Finally, the test showed that for WAR there was a statistically significant difference between the
season two years before the new contract and season one year prior to the new contract (p=.005),
the season prior to the new contract and the middle year(s) of the new contract (p=.038), and the
season prior to the new contract and the career averages (p=.000).
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Although the Bonferroni post hoc test for the repeated measures ANOVA did not show a
statistically significant difference between any of the statistical categories for the season prior to
the new contract and first season of the new contract, due to the large differences in means
between the two years for BA, SLG, OBP, and WAR a paired samples t-test was run between the
two years for each of the statistics. Interestingly each of the t-test’s came back significant; BA
(p=.05), SLG (p=.009), OBP (p=.028), and WAR (p=.014). Graphs showing the differences
between years for each statistical category are provided in the appendix.
The results of this study supported hypothesis 1 with respect to position players and in
part hypothesis 2, however it did not support hypothesis 3. As mentioned above the repeated
measure ANOVA did not show a statistically significant difference between the season before
the new contract and the first season of the new contract however after running a paired sample
t-test it was found that the difference in BA, SLG, OBP, and WAR were statistically significant.
Just as the hypothesis and expectancy theory predicted player performance decreased between
the year prior to a new contract and the first year of the new contract. This is evident both by
viewing table 3 as well as the graphs in the appendix.
Hypothesis two as well as expectancy theory had predicted that the closer a player gets to
the end of a contract term the more their performance should improve due to an increase in
instrumentality. This was supported in part by the fact that performance increased in each
statistical category between the season two years prior to a new contract and the season prior to a
new contract. Yet, the difference between means in the season two years prior to the season
contract and one year prior to the new contract was only found to be statistically significant for
18

WAR. The hypothesis was only partially supported because there was no significant difference
in means or statistically significant difference between the middle year(s) and the final year of
the new contract.
The third hypothesis was rejected as career performance figures for position players were
lower than, or equal to the performance figures for each statistical category during the first year
and middle year(s) of the new contract. Both the hypothesis and expectancy theory had predicted
that performance would have been lower during the first few years of the new contract as related
to career averages.
Starting Pitchers
The results of the starting pitchers repeated measures ANOVA as well as mean
performance data are presented in Table 4 and 5.
Table 4 Repeated Measures ANOVA for Starting Pitchers

Performance
Measures

Type III
Sum of
Squares

Df

Mean
Square

GreenhouseGeisser

p

ERA

2.883

2.911

.991

1.715

.176

K/9

5.639

2.985

1.889

2.046

.118

WHIP

.121

2.590

.047

2.146

.115

FPCT

.005

3.071

.001

.716

.550

WAR

61.543

2.655

23.178

4.236

.012
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Table 5 Starting Pitchers Mean/Std. Deviation Performance Statistics

Performance
Measures

Two
Years
Before
New
Contract

Year
Before
New
Contract

First Year
of New
Contract

Middle
Year(s) of
New
Contract

Last Year
of New
Contract

Career
Averages

ERA

4.08/.842

3.75/.859

3.59/.738

3.82/.559

3.96/.781

3.89/.364

K/9

7.00/1.44

7.53/1.53

7.68/1.57

7.46/1.45

7.32/1.58

7.28/1.01

WHIP

1.32/.135

1.28/.143

1.22/.152

1.25/.127

1.27/.155

1.28/.081

FPCT

.964/.053

.956/.044

.959/.030

.959/.026

.944/.044

.956/.017

WAR

2.26/1.56

3.74/2.21

4.29/2.50

3.31/1.75

2.61/2.37

2.57/1.04

The repeated measures ANOVA for position players only showed a statistical
significance between years for WAR. A Bonferroni post hoc test was then run to see which years
there was a statistically significant difference. The test showed that there was a significant
difference between the season two years before the new contract and first year of the new
contract (p=.007) and the first year of the new contract and career averages (p=.022).
Once again a paired sample t-test was run to compare the season prior to the new contract
and the first season of the new contract because of the large difference in means between the two
years although the repeated measures ANOVA did not show any statistical significance for any
of the performance measures. The paired samples t-test was run for ERA, WHIP, and WAR, but
only WHIP came back significant (p=.05). Graphs showing the differences between years for
each statistical category are provided in the appendix.
The results of this study for starting pitchers did not support hypotheses 1 and 3 as well
as the expectancy theory predictions associated with the two, while providing some support for
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hypothesis 2. Interestingly, not only was hypothesis one rejected but the data was completely
opposite of what was hypothesized. According to the hypothesis and expectancy theory’s
predictions a player’s performance should decline during the first year of a new contract due to a
decrease in instrumentality. Conversely, as seen in table 3, the means improved in each statistical
category from the year prior to the new contract and the first year of the new contract, although
the difference between the two years was only found statistically significant for WHIP (as
mentioned above).
Just as with position players hypothesis 2 was partially accepted as performance
improved between the year two years prior to the new contract and year prior to the new contract
in each statistical category with the exception of FPCT. It was only partially accepted however
because the means of each performance figure decreased between the middle year(s) of the new
contract and last year of the new contract. It is also important to note that each of these statistical
differences, although large in the context of baseball were not shown to be statistically
significant.
The final hypothesis that multi-year contracts decrease a player’s motivation to perform
during the first year/few years of a contract was rejected. In order for this hypothesis to have
been accepted there would have had to have been a significant decrease between a player’s
performance during the early years of a new contract and career averages. However performance
figures were actually better during the first few years of the contract as compared to career
averages. Once again the direction was opposite of what expectancy theory predicts. Although it
is important to note that career average performance was only higher than performance during
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the season two years prior to the new contract as well as ERA and FPCT during the last year of
the new contract.
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Discussion
This study provides further evidence to Ahlstrom et. al (1999) and Martin et. al (2011)
findings that position players motivation to perform and subsequently their performance
decreases during the first year of a new contract. It also provides insight into the effects of
expectancy theory on starting pitchers, which had not previously been analyzed. The results of
this study are very interesting in that they show some support for expectancy theories predictions
as related to performance for position players however are almost reverse of what is predicted for
starting pitchers. The results show that for position players performance tends to decrease during
the first year of a new contract as compared to the year prior to the new contract in every
statistical category and although these differences were not shown to be statistically significant
in the repeated measures ANOVA, BA, SLG, OBP, and WAR were all shown to be significant in
the paired samples t-test. From this it can be reasonably presumed that a position player’s
motivation to perform is higher during the year prior to the new contract than the first year of the
new contract. It is fascinating however that the first year of the new contracts performance,
although significantly lower than the year prior to the new contract is still in line with the
players’ career averages. This could mean that players are not motivated to perform at their
highest level any season other than the one prior to signing a new contract.
Conversely starting pitcher performance actually increased in each statistical category
during the first year of a new contract in relation to the year prior to the new contract and every
other season. However this difference was not found to be statistically significant for any
performance measure as analyzed by the repeated measures analysis and only WHIP for the
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paired sample t-test. These results as well as the lack of statistical significance could be
attributed to the small sample size of 20. Another possible explanation for the increase in
performance during the first year of a new contract could be that starting pitchers are not solely
motivated by money but rather other factors such as the location with which the team is located,
or praise from their teammates, coaches, and fans have an effect on their valence. Finally,
starting pitchers may be motivated to prove that they do indeed deserve the contract of which
they have just signed. This effect can be explained by equity theories predictions, which has yet
to have been studied with respect to starting pitchers.
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Recommendations
In a world where players are properly compensated for their performance and motivated
to perform at their highest level each year, one could expect to see a perfect correlation between
an MLB team’s yearly salaries and their on-field performance as well as no sharp or statistically
significant changes in any performance measures from one year to the next. The results of this
study however shows that this is not currently the case and therefore MLB’s form of player
compensation and its consequent effect on player motivation to perform can be improved.
Previous studies such as Lackritz (1990) and Dinerstein (2007) suggest that the best way to pay
players is annually, which conceptually makes a lot of sense from the perspective of expectancy
theories predictions. As long as monetary compensation is a main driver of a player’s
instrumentality and valence then their overall instrumentality should remain at a high level as
long as a contract is not guaranteed for more than one year and their next year’s salary is linked
to their previous year’s performance. Although this makes sense conceptually it may not work in
the context of baseball. This is because by only offering a player a one year contract this means
that after that one year they are free to sign with the team that offers them the most money. It
could be argued, that this would cause an increase in overall player salaries, as a bidding war
ensues among teams for the highest performing athletes, as well as high performing players to
move from teams with low payrolls to those with high. Currently one of the main reasons why
organizations sign players to long term contracts is so that they don’t have to worry about them
leaving their organization unless they are traded. There is also no guarantee that just because the
player performed at a certain level the year previous that their numbers will be the same that
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year. Although expectancy theory predicts that by offering one year contracts a player may be
motivated to perform at his highest level, there are other outside variables of which a player has
no control, such as injury, that could affect performance. This means that this system could still
result in a correlation between MLB team yearly salary and on-field performance that is less than
perfect.
I recommend that Major League Baseball’s organizations adopt a system similar to that
used in the sales industry: players are signed to long term contracts with a certain amount of
guaranteed money based on previous performance and negotiated bonuses for reaching specific
statistical milestones. This resembles the commission of a sales employee. This system allows
organizations to sign players to long term contracts without being at the total mercy of the
individual to perform at the predicted level each year. It also provides motivation for players to
perform at their highest level since pay is directly linked to performance, thus increasing
instrumentality regardless of how the rest of their team is performing. Thus, allaying the effects
of a decrease in player motivation associated with his team being out of playoff contention. Since
actual performance or output is directly linked to pay a team can expect for their yearly win-loss
record or on-field performance to be closely related to their yearly team salary. An example of
how such a contract would work with relation to home run (HR) incentives is presented in Table
6.
One of the key difficulties with changing MLB’s current form of player compensation is
the strength of Major League Baseball’s Players Association (MLBPA) and whether they
approve of the changes. However under this system players would have the potential to earn
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more money than they are currently. They would just have to earn it. Thus, there is reason to
believe that the MLBPA may approve the change. This system will mitigate the effects of
contract where players spend the majority or a large portion of their contract on the disabled list,
producing numbers significantly lower than projected or previously earned. A team would only
be liable for paying the players their guaranteed portion of the contract which would be quite
small in comparison to what an organization such as the Yankees are losing in a contract such as
Alex Rodriguez’s.
The main drawback to this system is the fact that organizations will not have a fixed team
salary and may end up spending much more or much less than expected. However through the
use of projections and analysis of previous performance, such as what is currently used to
determine a player’s compensation, teams should be able to develop ballpark figures as to what
their team salary will be. On the other hand although they may end up spending a little more than
projected they will be reaping the benefits of higher than expected performance and would not
have to worry as much about paying their players large sums of money and not seeing a positive
outcome on the field. Another issue to discuss is the possible “cheating of the system” by players
or teams. For example a team who is out of playoff contention sitting a player so that they do not
reach certain statistical milestones associated with pay increases or players developing phony
injuries so that specific performance measures do not decrease below the milestone associated
with a pay increase. However these types of problems can be eradicated by instituting clauses in
contracts where a team must play a player a certain number of games or on the flip side the
player must play a certain number of games with a specific percentage coming late in the season
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in order to be eligible for the pay increases. It is important to note that in order for this system to
work the statistical categories associated with bonuses should be individualistic while linked to
overall team performance. This will decrease a player’s feelings of in-equity when playing for a
lower performing team. Further studies would need to be conducted in order to determine what
these statistical categories should be and the size of the pay increase associated with reaching
certain statistical milestones.
Table 6 Recommended Systems Compensation Structure Example

Base Salary

$2,500,000

HR Incentives

Bonus

20-25 HR

$1,000,000

26-30 HR

$2,500,000

31-35 HR

$3,000,000

36-40 HR

$4,000,000

Etc.

Etc
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Limitations and Future Research
The results presented in this study have certain limitations in terms of analysis. One is the
relatively small sample size. Due to the difficulty in acquiring both complete and accurate data
with respect to MLB player contract terms only those players who were on an active roster in
2012 and reached the subsequent criteria for this study were able to be included. As a result only
65 total players, 45 position players, and 20 starting pitchers were included. This small sample
size may have prevented some of the differences in means between years to be shown as
statistically significant.
Another limitation is performance figures used. Each of the figures were chosen due to
their use in previous studies or their importance in determining a players level of compensation.
However, they may not have equally shown the differences in a players increase in or decrease in
motivation. For example, if a player is less motivated and thus spends less time in the batting
cage what affect if any would this have on fielding percentage or vice versa?
Finally, this study assumes that a player’s level of compensation or pay is the primary
reward associated with an individual’s instrumentality and ultimately has a high valence.
However there may be other factors that are more important to certain players such as the
location with which the team is located, or praise from their teammates, coaches, and fans.
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Conclusion
This study provides further evidence that expectancy theory’s predictions apply in the
context of Major League Baseball positions players. This is evident by the decrease in
performance for position players in every statistical category from the season prior to the new
contract and the first season of the new contract. This study also presents interesting finding with
respect to starting pitchers and expectancy theory’s predictions as the results of the statistical
analysis were opposite of what expectancy theory predicts. Further research will be needed to
understand the exact reasoning behind the starting pitchers performance results as this is the
study to have analyzed expectancy theory’s predictions using starting pitchers.
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Appendix: Statistical Analysis Data
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Batting Average Means

0.295

0.290

0.285
Mean BA
0.280

0.275

0.270
Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

Year 6

Slugging Percentage Means

0.490
0.480
0.470
0.460
Mean SLG

0.450
0.440
0.430
0.420
Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4
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Year 5

Year 6

On-Base Percentage Means

0.370
0.365
0.360
0.355
Mean OBP

0.350
0.345
0.340
0.335
Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

Year 6

Positions Players FPCT Means

0.987
0.986
0.985
0.984
0.983
FPCT Means

0.982
0.981
0.980
0.979
0.978
Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4
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Year 5

Year 6

Position Players WAR Means

4.25
4.00
3.75
3.50
3.25
WAR Means

3.00
2.75
2.50
2.25
2.00
Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

Year 6

Earned Run Average Means

4.20
4.10
4.00
3.90
3.80
ERA Means

3.70
3.60
3.50
3.40
3.30
Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4
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Year 5

Year 6

Strikeouts Per Nine Innings Pitched Means

7.80
7.60
7.40
7.20

K/9 Means

7.00
6.80
6.60
Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

Year 6

WHIP Means

1.34
1.32
1.30
1.28
1.26
WHIP Means

1.24
1.22
1.20
1.18
1.16
Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4
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Year 5

Year 6

Starting Pitchers FPCT Means

0.970
0.965
0.960
0.955
0.950

FPCT Means

0.945
0.940
0.935
0.930
Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

Year 6

Starting Pitchers WAR Means

4.50
4.25
4.00
3.75
3.50
3.25

WAR Means

3.00
2.75
2.50
2.25
2.00
Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4
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Year 5

Year 6
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